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ARGUMENT
I.

Absent a showing of reasonable suspicion, Law Enforcement
exceeded the permissible scope of detention for a traffic
stop when they continued to detain and question Defendant
about matters which where unrelated to the initial stop.
The State, does not challenge Defendant's first argument

that, absent reasonable suspicion, the second time officers
approached the vehicle they exceeded the scope of a traffic stop
detention. Brief

of Appellee

at 11, 17.

The Trial Court found

that Officer Anderson's first question to the other occupant of
the vehicle was outside of the scope of the traffic detention.
R.37:56.
Defendant does not dispute that Officer Anderson had a
justifiable reason to stop and detain the vehicle and its driver
for purposes of a traffic stop.

However, the scope of that

detention was exceeded when both Officers' decided to approach
the vehicle and interrogate the Defendant about unrelated
matters; "the length and scope of the detention must be strictly
tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its
initiation permissible." R.37:16; R.42:19; State
P.2d 761, 763. (Utah 1991).

v.

Johnson,

Absent reasonable suspicion of

further criminal activity, the second approach interrogation,
exceeded the scope of a permissible traffic stop. State
Cotero,

873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994).
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II.

Upon approaching the vehicle the second time, Officers
Anderson and Archuletta did not have a reasonable suspicion
that the Defendant had been, was, or was about to engage in
criminal activity.
Prior to a court finding that officers have reasonable

suspicion to detain a defendant, a court must first examine the
facts available to the officers before that detention began.
State

v.

Alvarez,

2006 UT P15, P16 (Utah 2006).

In Alvarez,

the

police officers detained a man who they suspected was involved
with the possession and distribution of narcotics. Id.

The

Officers were aware of the following information:
1) information from an unidentified source that drug
transactions were occurring in the area that the defendant
Alvarez was frequenting;
2) information reported to one officer by the Salt Lake City
Narcotics Unit, that the vehicle the defendant was driving
had been used in a recent drug transaction, 20 blocks from
the defendant's current location;
3) the vehicle the defendant was driving had within it an
image of Jesus Malverde;
4) the vehicle the defendant was driving had in its interior
a small water bottle;
5) the vehicle the defendant was driving was uninsured;
6) one officer had observed the defendant enter the same
condominium, which both officers had just observed him
enter, at approximately the same time of the day and
Page - 2 -

remain inside for approximately the same amount of time;
7) and both officers observed the defendant enter the same
condominium which he had entered the previous day at
approximately the same time of day and remain inside the
condominium for approximately the same amount of time.
The Court held that these facts allowed the officers to
temporarily detain the defendant for reasonable suspicion of
possible criminal activity.

Id.

In this case, as Officer Anderson approached the vehicle for
the Second time with Officer Achuletta, he was aware of the
following facts:
1) that the vehicle, not the Defendant, had been seen earlier at
the Riverside Motel 1 , R. 37:16, 42:20-21;
2) that the occupants of the vehicle were acting nervous, 2 R.
37:16, R. 42:10;

1

The Riverside Motel is a multiple residence unit in
Helper, Utah, where people live and it is legal to visit. R.
37:38. The officers in this case testified that they were aware
of some recent illegal drug activity that had occurred at the
Riverside Motel. R. 37:6.
2

Contrary to the State's assertion Officer Anderson only
described the Defendant's conduct as that of extreme nervousness.
R.37:16, R42:10. Officer Anderson did not testify that the
Defendant behaved in any evasive manner. Id.
Officer Archuletta
contrary to his sworn testimony at the Preliminary Hearing and
the Suppression Hearing did not have any contact with the
Defendant prior to the initiation of the extended detention.
R.37:34.
Defendant objects to the State's characterization that his
conduct or behavior was evasive at anytime prior to the extended
detention.
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3)that it was approximately 3:00 a.m. in the morning, R.37:5;
4)that there was an unconnected amplifier on the floor of the
vehicle, R.42:7.
Officer Archuletta as he approached the vehicle for the first
time was aware of the following:
1) he had seen two unidentified people working on the vehicle's
driver's side door approximately two hours before, from a
distance of approximately 20 feet, while he was driving the
past the Riverside Motel. R.37:32,38.3 4
In Alverez,

the Utah Supreme Court was careful to emphasize

that the facts in that case supported a finding of reasonable
suspicion at its bare minimums; "[T]he totality of the facts
barely meets the threshold of reasonable and articulable
suspicion" . . . and that "the absence of any one of the facts
[would] have dictated a different decision." Alverez

at P19..

The facts of this case are significantly less than those in
3

Contrary to the State's assertion there is nothing in the
record to indicate that Officer Archuletta recognized the men he
observed were working on the door that night. State's Brief at
12. The State's use of the Officers' statements to the Defendant
and the driver in the videotape are not indicative of what the
officer knew or who he recognized. They are not sworn statements
and could have easily been an interrogation tactic to attempt to
get the Defendant to admit something by feigning knowledge of the
event.
4

Neither Officer Anderson or Officer Archuletta testified
that in their experience and training it was common for people to
hide drugs in a vehicle's doors. Officer Archuletta did not
identify this as a concern nor did he indicate, in his testimony
at either hearing, that he told Officer Anderson this
information.
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Alvarez.
The Court held in Alvarez,

that it was very significant that

there had been direct testimony from the arresting officer
indicating that consistent with his training and experience, the
repetitive and observed behavior of the defendant, returning to
the same location, at the same time of day, for a short period of
time, was indicative of the behavior of a drug dealer. Id.

at P3-4.

In this case there was no such testimony or evidence.
Officer Anderson observed, the early morning hour, the
Defendant's nervousness, and an unhooked amplifier. R.37:5,16;
R.42:7,20-21.

Officer Archuletta told Officer Anderson that the

vehicle had been at the Riverside Motel two hours earlier.
R.37:6; R.42:6.

In Alvarez,

the vehicle that the defendant was

driving had been seen a least three times at two different drug
locations. Alvarez,

at P3-4. Two of those three times the

defendant was driving the suspected vehicle. Id.

The officers did

not know whether the Defendant was at Riverside Motel.

That the

Defendant was a passenger in a car that had been seen at a
Riverside Motel is not indicative of criminal activity.
v.

Illinois,

Yabarra

444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979).

In both Alvarez,

and Terry v.

Ohio,

innocuous behavior

became reasonably suspicious when that behavior was repeatedly
observed or corroborated. Alvarez, at P18; Terry
U.S. 1, 6-7

(1968).

v.

Ohio,

392

In this case, prior to officer's approaching
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the vehicle the second time and commencing their prolonged
detention of the Defendant, there was no such repeated behavior
nor was there any distinct behavior that officers' testified was
in their experience indicative of criminal activity.
It is not the Defendant's intention to use a "divide and
conquer analysis," in his appeal of the Trial Court's incorrect
suppression ruling. Alvarez,
6-7 (1968).

at P18; Terry

v.

Ohio,

392 U.S. 1,

Objectively the continued detention of the defendant

was not justifiable.
The early hour, Defendant's nervous behavior, and the
unhooked amplifier, although innocent enough, might be considered
as part of a reasonable suspicion analysis.

However, they should

not be given more weight than the image of Jesus Malvida and the
small water bottle in Alverez.

Alverez

at P16.

Admittedly, the most suspicious fact of which they were
aware was the previous location of the vehicle. R.37:32,38.
However, this single sighting had occurred at least two hours
earlier. R.37:31.

Furthermore, there is no evidence that the

Defendant was ever at the Riverside Motel.
It was only from the double interrogation of the Defendant
and the other occupant that the zig-zag papers, the speaker bags,
the tobacco pipe, and the coin were observed.

The only reason

the officers engaged in this interrogation technique was to find
out more about why the vehicle and the driver had been at the
Riverside Motel.

R.37:24, 42:21.

Prior to approaching the
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vehicle the second time, the officers had nothing more than an
hunch that the Defendant may have been involved in criminal
activity.

Id.

It is at this moment that the unauthorized detention of the
Defendant began.

The questions posed to him were accusatory and

outside the scope of a routine traffic stop.

The evidence in

this case should be suppressed.

III. Defendant's criminal history is not a factor which is to be
considered in an analysis of whether it is reasonable to
suspect him of current criminal activity.

In April of 2003 the Utah Supreme Court held,
Those asking us to overturn prior precedent have a
substantial burden of persuasion due to the doctrine of
stare decisis. ... When we are clearly convinced that a
rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound
because of changing conditions and that more good than
harm will come by departing form precedent we are not
inexorably bound by our own precedents.
State
v. Machley,
67 P.3d 477, 480 (Utah 2003).
The State, has not met the Mauchley
that State

v.

improper, see

Brooks

and State

v.

standard. Id.
Ranquist

Its request

be overruled is

Brief and Appellee at 15; State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d

640 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); State v.

Ranquist,

128 P.3d 1201 (Utah

Ct. App. 2005).
For this court to hold that a person's past recorded
criminal conduct allows an officer to suspect that person of
recent criminal activity, diminishes the protections afforded all
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citizens under the 4th Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the
U.S. and Utah Constitutions. U.S. Constitution. Amend. IV; UT.
Const, art. I § 14 (West 2006).

It discourages change among

those who commit crimes, by never allowing a restoration of their
right to privacy.
CONCLUSION
The evidence presented to the Trial Court at either hearing
viewed subjectively or objectively was not sufficient to support
a finding of reasonable suspicion to justify a prolonged
detention.

Defendant respectfully requests that the Trial

Court's ruling on the suppression of evidence be reversed.
DATED this _/f_ day of January, 2007.

Samuel S. Bailey
Attorney for the Defendant
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